Drawing on the work of cultural anthropologists Clifford Geertz and Marshall Sahlins, I suggest a layered conceptualization of diplomacy as consisting of myths, sociabilities and practices which allows us to open the question of diplomacy's Euro-centrism to empirical scrutiny. As do all known diplomatic systems, European diplomacy has its roots in the social systems of kinship and religion. It is rooted in Christian mythology, and this mythology informs its sociabilities and practices. Three mini-case studies (of diplomatic immunity, permanent representation and the institution of dean of the corps diplomatique) demonstrate that this mythology shines through in present-day diplomacy as well. Since diplomatic practices bear the mark of a European cultural context, it privileges the life chances of those native to that context. In this sense, diplomacy is Euro-centric. I then go on to argue that, empirically, this does not seem to be a particularly pressing problem. The real problem may be external to diplomacy itself, and concern the idea that European diplomacy was uniquely peaceful. As I demonstrate by means of a ministudy of Iroquois diplomacy, this is simply not the case. If the erroneous idea of uniquely peaceful European diplomacy is paired up with a framing of relations between European and non-European polities in terms of peaceful diplomacy, the result may easily be that we occlude other aspects of those relations, such as conquest and colonialization. The Euro-centrism of diplomacy that matters is thus less to do with diplomatic practices than with mnemonic practices about diplomacy.
Introduction
There are at least two key reasons to ask whether or not diplomacy is Euro-centric.
2 First, the question is posed in political global debates every day. It is the scholar's task to scrutinize such questions and ask if, and in what senses, it holds true. Second, if diplomacy is Euro-centric, it raises the new question of what effects that has. I begin by discussing how present-day diplomacy rests on a specific myth and is constituted by specific narrative sociabilities and practices. I go on to argue that diplomacy is Euro-centric in the sense that its predominantly European origins still mark a number of its practices. We should not ascribe too much importance to diplomacy's Christian origins for present-day conditions, however, since the origins of a given practice do not compromise that practice ipso facto. What should worry us is the, often tacit, conflation of two other representations. The first representation is that grounding diplomacy in a myth of peace is uniquely European. As I demonstrate by means of a mini-study of Iroquois diplomacy, this is simply not the case. The second representation is that there is no glitch between myth and practice, so that really existing European diplomacy has indeed been as peaceful as its myths would have it. This is not the case either. All this matters, for when the representation of diplomacy as the peaceful aspect of relations between polities conflates with the representation of European practices as uniquely peaceful, the result is easily that sequences marked primarily by conquest and colonialism come instead to be remembered as sequences marked primarily by diplomacy (Barkawi, 2005; Muppidi, 2004) . In sum, the question of diplomacy's Euro-centrism is not first and foremost pertinent to ongoing practices of diplomacy itself, but rather to mnemonic practices pertaining to the global history of which diplomacy is part.
The question is far from new. In the 1960s, when rapid decolonization increased the number of states, the European bias of diplomacy was the issue of some political and scholarly debate, with scholars like Ali Mazrui (1977) calling for more cultural pluralism, and scholars like Martin Wight (1966) insisting on the moral superiority of 'Western values' as a basis for international relations generally and diplomacy specifically. This debate died away as new states proved sticklers for diplomatic etiquette (as newcomers so often do), and the extant practices of diplomacy seemed to prevail. With globalization, and particularly with the growing interest in post-colonial theory, this debate is back on the political and academic agenda.
Drawing on cultural anthropologists Clifford Geertz's and Marshall Sahlins's work on myth and narrative sociabilities, respectively, the first part of the article attempts to theorize diplomacy in terms of its historical preconditions for action and the way it operates as a social practice. Part two discusses diplomatic immunity, permanent representation and the institution of dean of the corps diplomatique in the present-day system and demonstrates that Christian myths do indeed colour these sociabilities. I take this to demonstrate that contemporary diplomacy is Euro-centric. I go on to argue that the Euro-centrism of present diplomatic practices is of less consequence than the tendency to argue that European diplomacy is historically uniquely peaceful. The problem of Euro-centrism to diplomacy may be less to do with diplomatic practices as such than for the effects wrought by invoking the idea that European diplomacy was not only uniquely peaceful, but also the main frame for encounters between European and non-European polities. Such a move has the effect of occluding other discourses and practices that were also afoot, including those of conquest and colonialism.
Three layers of diplomacy: Myth, sociability, practice
In his study of Bali before the Dutch conquest, Geertz highlights the importance of myth to political discourse. Polities are held together by a set of norms and rules about how the world 'is', that is, an ontology: 'The crucial task of legitimation -the reconciliation of this political metaphysic with the existing distribution of power in nineteenth-century Bali -was effected by means of myth; characteristically enough, a colonizing myth' (Geertz, 1980: 13) . In Geertz's study, the myth in question is that the Balinese polity, Negara, is the successor of the Javanese kingdom Majapahit, which conquered Bali militarily in 1343 and went on to define what Geertz chooses to name a 'standard of civilization' (Geertz, 1980) . Myths are to Geertz a special kind of idea, with ideas being not 'unobservable mental stuff', but rather 'envehicled meanings, the vehicles being symbols (or in some usages, signs), a symbol being anything that denotes, describes, represents, exemplifies, labels, indicates, evokes, depicts, expresses -anything that somehow or other signifies' (Geertz, 1980: 135) . Myth, then, makes possible more specific claims about the world. Note that myths thus understood are an inevitable social phenomenon, not to be mistaken for the misleading generalities that the term denotes in everyday speech (and, deplorably, also in otherwise valuable scholarly works such as Obeyesekere [1992] and Hobson [2004] ).
This insight may be extended to a polity's view of the world around it as well. We may then ask which myths enable diplomatic discourses. As I have argued elsewhere (Neumann, 2011) , all known diplomatic systems rest on metaphors to do with religion and kinship. The value of Geertz's study to the student of diplomacy does not lie in substance -myths of conquest must necessarily be different from myths of consensusbut in an understanding of the importance of preconfigurations of knowledge to the establishment and perpetuation of regular contacts.
The next step must be to specify what these contacts are. For this, we may turn to Marshall Sahlins's work on pre-contact political structures in the Pacific and on Captain Cook's arrival in Hawai'i. To Sahlins, as to Geertz, myth is the precondition for understanding (cf. Sahlins, 1981; Lincoln, 1989; Flood, 2002) . Sahlins goes on to suggest that myth is overlaid by what he calls narrative sociability. Each type of situation has a set of categories and relationships that is pertinent to it. Typically, these narratives are more specific than myths. For example, there will exist a narrative about how a representative of another political entity should be heralded, received and treated by the head of a polity (e.g. as a diplomatic envoy). This narrative will have an affinity to myth.
In the case of diplomacy, the key thing is that the affinity to myth will imply that the same type of situation will have different narrative sociabilities within different cultures. For example, in Europe, if a person wholly unknown by appearance and name arrived in a community in the late 18th century, the situation would have a number of narrative sociabilities attached to it. The person could be a pilgrim, a trader, an envoy and so on. There would be sartorial and habitual categories with which to distinguish between these sociabilities. The narrative sociability attached to the envoy would be founded on religious myth, but the chances of the envoy being read as anything other than a human being (say, an angel) would be small (but not non-existent). Compare this to the case of Captain Cook's arrival in Hawai'i, where Sahlins's argument is that the category of akua -'god' -was the one that was brought into play simply because the narrative sociability of this specific situation demonstrated an overwhelming fit with the myth upon which the narrative sociability rested. Crucially, Sahlins argues that a society's identification between narrative sociability and myth is not necessarily self-reflective, and that it certainly was not on the part of the Hawai'ians (Obeyesekere, 1992; Sahlins, 1981 Sahlins, , 1995 . The implication of this is that the cultural setting of diplomatic encounters is always already not only a situated one, and not only one marked by a lack of cultural information about the other party, but also one that may be marked by a lack of reflectiveness about one's own party's preconditions for action.
If myths constitute the basic layer of diplomacy and the second layer may be thought of as narrative sociabilities, then the third and top layer of discourse is practice. Practices give shape to specific diplomatic events. Specific practices include accreditation of foreign diplomats, treaty-making, forms of greetings, dress codes and many more. In contemporary diplomacy, formalization is inextricably linked to law-making. Taken together, myth, narrative sociability and practices may be understood as layered discourse. Political myths found narrative sociabilities. Diplomacy arises out of clashing sociabilities.
Christendom to Europe: The emergence of European diplomacy
In his genealogy of Western diplomacy, James Der Derian (1987) discusses the emergence of state-to-state diplomacy in Europe from the 16th century onwards out of the political myth of Christendom, which is that the entire world consists of polities that are united in Christ. Following genealogical tradition, Der Derian underlines the open quality of the myth, and then highlights the role of Augustinian thinking to Western Christian diplomacy. Augustine specified the historical existence of what he called cities (i.e. polities) to stretch from the fall of the angels until Doomsday, and saw the historical task of the city as being the purification of its resident souls. The cities are ideally united, as humanity as such is ideally united in Christ. When united, there is peace and justice all around. It does happen, however, that cities stray from their course. Diplomatic relations are only required when what the myth lays down as the natural state, namely peace, is in jeopardy. Consequently, diplomacy is a necessary but tainted business, since the need for it arises only when humans stray from God. To Augustine, diplomacy's sociability is suspect, for the very fact that it is needed is a reminder that history may not march on towards the ideal Christian society that Augustine postulates.
Narrative sociabilities of European diplomacy sprang directly from the Christian founding myths. We have a wonderful example from 1182, which is the time when religiously defined Christendom begins to transform into territorially defined Europe:
Vladimir, Prince of Galitch, on being upbraided for not honouring a promise made on the cross of St Stephen, retorted that it had only been a very small cross, to which the complainant's envoy replied that it was nonetheless miraculous and that the Prince should be fearful for his life. (Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995: 94) Note that this interaction would have been impossible had there not existed a myth that laid down peaceful relations as the norm and a narrative sociability concerning the drawing up of promises, agreements and treaties, with specific ritual practices (the kissing of the cross was a practice which bound the kisser to the agreement entered into; Vernadsky, 1948: 95) and sanctions (heavenly punishment for breaking promises). Note, furthermore, that the myth and the narrative sociability are doxic and unchallengeable on their merits. In 1152, Vladimir is reduced to quibbling over ritual execution rather than over ritual as such, about adherence to a norm rather than about the norm itself. By the high Middle Ages, the diplomacy of Western Christendom was indeed well established and culturally dense.
In order to get at our main question of the possible Euro-centric nature of present-day global diplomacy, the questions we have to ask next is whether, in what degree and how the founding myth and the narrative sociabilities of the diplomacy of Christendom carried over into European diplomacy. As a preliminary, we note the change in conceptaway from the overtly religious Christendom, towards Europe. At first glance, this may look like desacralization. A stronger reading may be, however, that the religious fissures first between the orthodox and the catholic, and then between the Catholics and the Protestants, called for a concept which could be uniting by not referring directly to what was in dispute. 'Europe' was such a term. We note that no one spoke up against the use of the new term, that it was tied to the rallying of Christian counter-forces in the first half of the 15th century against the Ottoman onslaught that eventually brought down Constantinople in 1453, and that its first use in a book title was by Enea Piccolomini, who later became Pope Pius II. Conceptually, as well as politically, Europe is the successor of Christendom, and the succession was brought about by a battle between two selfconsciously religion-based political entitities. Where there is succession, there is usually continuity.
Christian myths in contemporary diplomacy
Among the many who have nonetheless chosen to stress the break in diplomatic practices at the time of the Renaissance rather than their continuity is James Der Derian. He highlights how Machiavelli's reading of the Italian situation 'exploded the remnants of a mythical Christian unity to open the way for a system of diplomacy based on states' interests' (Der Derian, 1987: 102) . If Der Derian's argument is that the tenets of Christianity did not inform policymaking directly, then I concur. We have, for example, a whole plethora of examples of Christian rulers who formed alliances with infidels against other Christian rulers. There are, however, at least three problems with using this fact to argue for the demise of Christian unity. First, the phenomenon is not new; we have examples of alliances that do not follow religious lines from before as well. Second, there will always be glitches between the mythological layer of discourse and less foundational layers. Put differently, no system of cultural meaning wholly determines outcomes. Third, and perhaps most importantly, even if we grant that Machiavelli isolated analytically a new rationality of government (and I think we should), and even if this rationality of government became pervasive among parts of the ruling class, the ensuing specific discourse on politics could still be very uneasily embedded in overall discourse. This, I think, was the case historically. It follows that Machiavelli's influence on policymakers, however strong it may have been, does not warrant the exclusion of either myth or religion as factors pertaining to diplomacy.
Contemporaries at the time certainly thought so. The diplomacy of early contemporary Europe was certainly embedded in general Christian discourse, as was the selfpresentation of its rulers. As Christian Reus-Smit puts it, the 'old' diplomacy of absolutist Europe rested on a moral purpose of heavenly salvation according to Christian teachings.
3 Earthly powers were ordered in a hierarchy of descending closeness to God, with France on top, then other Christian rulers, then non-Christian rulers (that is, barbarians). One may add to this people who were seen to be without rulers altogether, that is, savages. Having broken away from the overlordship of the Church, the emerging states of Europe 'reimagined' the world: the moral purpose of the state was defined as the preservation of a divinely ordained, rigidly hierarchical social order. To fulfil this purpose, monarchs were endowed with supreme authority -their commands were law [and law was first and foremost command rather than an outcome of negotiation, enacted ritual, codification or the like]. Procedural justice was thus defined in strict, authoritative terms. God's law and natural law were the ultimate arbiters of what constituted justice, and they received worldly expression in the commands of the dynastic monarchs. (Reus-Smit, 1999: 94) Law became a divinely sanctioned instrument of power, rather than a frame for its circulation. By isomorphism, emerging international law (increasingly understood as ius inter gentes rather than ius gentium) was also rooted in something divine, namely human nature -as natural law. These social conditions, Reus-Smit argues, were specific prerequisites for the emergence of 'old' diplomacy. The key point here is that these social conditions were religiously constituted. 4 They maintained a strong if unevenly dispersed presence in European politics. As late as 1815, although Tsar Alexander of Russia did not succeed in making his 'holy alliance' the framework for a new European diplomatic order, he still managed to recruit his 'brothers in Christ', the Habsburg emperor and the king of Prussia, with a treaty text that bore the explicit religious and kinship markers of the diplomacy of Christendom.
Remnants of Christian myths in three contemporary sociabilities
These hermeneutical and institutional arguments in favour of Christianity's importance to 'old' diplomacy may be further substantiated by focusing on three sociabilities that are part of contemporary diplomatic culture in the strong sense of being intersubjective to world diplomats, and which are ostensibly functional. These three mini-cases concern the immunity of the envoy, the exchange of permanent representatives and the ordering of the corps diplomatique. Historially, the three sociabilities presuppose one another sequentially, in the sense that the first is a precondition for the second to emerge, and the second for the third. To what degree do Christian myths mark these modular and contemporary sociabilities?
Sociability I: Immunity of envoys
In international law, the key code on diplomacy and diplomats is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations from 1961, the result of legal codification work initiated by the victors of World War II. The immunity of the envoy from the legal system of the host state is its centrepiece (Frey and Frey, 1999 ). As noted above, within diplomatic systems, the immunity of envoys has traditionally had religious licence. Contemporary diplomacy is no exception. Within Christendom, Hamilton and Langhorne (1995) trace immunity to the late middle ages. Having established the functionality of reciprocity (if I grant immunity to your envoy, then you will grant immunity to mine), they stress the importance of religious sanction. It was God's will that His children should live in peace with one another and that Christendom as such stood to gain from the existence of envoys between worldly power-holders. These were the specific ideas to which Bertrand du Rosier referred in the first-ever textbook for diplomats from 1436 when he wrote that an ambassador is sacred because he acts for the general welfare (see Mattingly, 1955) . This idea found its way into legal Christian discourse, where the ambassador -one's own as well as that of the enemy -was described as a representative of Christendom in its entirety. Many lawyers held that, for this reason, murdering an envoy was not just a worldly crime, but also sacrilege, and that the murderer ought to have conferred upon him the status of enemy of mankind. Immunity was then extended from safety of life and limb to safety from the laws of the host country and safety of possessions. Anderson (1993: 54) gives some examples:
The immunity of diplomats from civil proceedings was also being more and more clearly asserted. This was a process which extended over a long period, and in the seventeenth century the extent of their privileges in this respect was still far from clear. In 1666 the Portuguese minister-resident in the Dutch republic had his household goods seized for debt; and when, two years later, he attempted to leave for Portugal his creditors secured a court order for his arrest. The most important and spectacular case, however, came in London when, in September 1708, A[ndrey] A. Matveyev, the Russian minister, was arrested on the complaint of a number of tradesmen to whom he owed money. He spent only a few hours in prison; but when he was released the heads of all the foreign missions in London (except that of Sweden, which was then at war with Russia) accompanied him to his house in a demonstration of solidarity and next morning visited him to promise their support. The following year saw the passing by [the English] Parliament of legislation protecting foreign diplomats against criminal and civic proceedings.
Note that all the foreign missions in London at the time represented Christian powers. As to relations with non-Christians, within the specifically Christian frame of meaning surrounding the immunity of the envoy, granting the right of worship (droit de chapelle) to those who believed otherwise had the implication of recognizing them as children of God. Crucially, since reciprocity was the key aspect of all European diplomatic sociabilities, as seen from Europe, the granting of a right of worship by non-Christian powers would be read not only functionally, but also as a tacit approval of the idea that we are all children of God. Such a seemingly universalist idea is culturally specific in the highest degree. It also demonstrates how an idea such as reciprocity, which is often understood to be functional, is actually culturally specific.
Sociability II: Permanent representation
One notes that, by 1708, permanent representation was becoming the rule between the European powers. Matveyev was Russia's first permanent representative to England, so it was still not firmly established. Standard histories of diplomacy point to the city-states of Renaissance Italy, Machiavelli's home turf, as the birthplace of permanent representation. In 1455, the Duke of Milan sent Nicodema de Pontremoli to Genoa in order to set up a permanent representation. At about the same time, a Venetian author, Mario Sanuto the younger, used the term 'ambasciatore' about an envoy (Numelin, 1954) . We may say that we have here the first exchange of resident ambassadors. Nothing has only one beginning, however, and James Der Derian notes that already in 453, Pope Leo the Great and the archbishop of Ravenna exchanged representatives (Der Derian, 1987) . 5 We may add that this was only the beginning of what was to become an institutionalized practice. In the first volume of The New Catholic Encyclopedia (1907), we find an article on the 'Apocrisiarius', a character that extant scholarship has either written off as irrelevant (Mattingly, 1955: 56) or simply noted (Jönsson and Hall, 2005: 112 ) : (Gr. apochrisis, an answer; cf. Lat. responsalis, from responsum). This term indicates in general the ecclesiastical envoys of Christian antiquity, whether permanent or sent temporarily on missions to high ecclesiastical authorities or royal courts. In the East the patriarchs had their apocrisiarii at the imperial court, and the metropolitans theirs at the courts of the patriarchs. The popes also frequently deputed clerics of the Roman Church as envoys, either for the adjustment of important questions affecting the Church of Rome, or to settle points of discipline in local dioceses, or to safeguard the interests of the Church in religious controversies. In the letters of St Gregory the Great (590-604) very frequent mention is made of such envoys (responsales). In view of the great importance attaching to the relations between the popes and the imperial court of Constantinople, especially after the fall of the Western Empire (476), and during the great dogmatic controversies in the Greek Church, these papal representatives at Constantinople took on gradually the character of permanent legates and were accounted the most important and responsible among the papal envoys.… From the reign of Charlemagne (d. 814) we find apocrisiarii at the court of the Frankish kings, but they are only royal archchaplains decorated with the title of the ancient papal envoys. 6 Furthermore, Byzantine envoys, for example those sent to Kiev at the end of the 14th century, were also sometimes called apokrisiarii (Obolensky, 1982 (Obolensky, [1970 : 23). We have here a fully fledged case of institutionalized diplomacy, which, as will be seen, included permanent representation. Note, furthermore, the close contacts between Byzantium and the Italian city-states. After all, Byzantine hegemony in the area had only been broken by the Lombards in 751, and Sicily only finally fell to the Arabs in 902. In his study of what we would now call hybridization between Byzantium and what he calls Western cultures, Geanakoplos (1976: 73; cf. Mattingly, 1955) writes that 'a comparison of Venetian and Byzantine diplomatic practices in the late medieval and Renaissance periods … would probably reveal no small degree of direct or indirect Byzantine influence'. The existence of the institution of apocrisiarius means that we already know enough to conclude that the origins of permanent diplomacy, far from being secular, are actually specifically Christian. One way of understanding permanent diplomacy's spread from the Italian city-states to become a Europe-wide phenomenon, furthermore, may be to highlight its compensatory nature. The Reformation had certainly weakened the Christian political myth by demonstrating that the split between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches was not a unique case of schism. Schism was an ever-present possibility. Permanent representation may be understood as a new Christian narrative sociability, which arose as a result of the weakening of the founding myth of Christian diplomacy. Such an understanding highlights the continuing importance of Christianity to the spread of the narrative sociability that is permanent representation.
As for permanent representation with non-Christian entities, at the time of the formation of the diplomatic corps there was only one such, namely, the Sublime Porte in Constantinople. In European-Ottoman relations, we also have a nice example of how sociabilities change. As did the Byzantines before them (and as did the Mongols and the Chinese), the Ottomans considered the sending of envoys a mark of submission. 7 Consequently, they followed the Islamic practice vis-a-vis tribute entities called amān when establishing peaceful relations not only with Islamic polities like Persia, but also with European states (Ari, 2004) . Amān, roughly safety or security, meant that you were under somebody's protection. If the initial contacts went well, the next step for the Porte was to grant an ahdname. Ahdname (from Ar. ahd, 'treaty' and Per. name, 'writ'), translated into English as capitulations (from Lat. capitula, 'chapter heading'), were granted to merchants for a year at a time, and gave them the right to trade without having to pay taxes.
8 'Such concessions', Lewis (1988: 84) explains:
perceived by European trading states as treaties, by the Muslim rulers as edicts, were granted by Muslim sovereigns in North Africa, Egypt, Turkey, Iran and elsewhere. The capitulations, in Ottoman ahdname, 'covenant-letter', were granted by the sultans as an act of condescension. The rights and privileges accorded to the foreign merchant communities in the Empire were a logical extension of the autonomy of the dhimmi [non-Muslim] communities and of the medieval Muslim practice of amān.
The difference in perception is due to there being two different sociabilities in play. The Ottomans' sociability was the granting of a charter to facilitate trade, not one built on recognition of other polities, and certainly not on reciprocity. It was the Ottoman sociability that framed early relations, including the terms on which permanent representations were established. Europeans adapted to this different sociability. When the first permanent representation, the English one, was established in 1535, it was paid for by the Levant Company (Berridge, 2004) . As it happened, there was considerable overlap between the two sociabilities, for example, in terms of immunity. In the 1660s, the Sublime Porte issued a beirat which, Anderson (1989: 95) tells us, stated that, 'The consul could not be arrested for interrogation, imprisoned, or dismissed from office; his house could not be searched or sealed up; his clothing, victuals, and other domestic supplies could be imported free of custom; lawsuits in which he was involved had to go straight to the supreme court.' There were also crucial differences, however. For example, both amān and ahdname were often rescinded in times of war. This made for complications. In 1780, ambassador Sir Robert Ainslie wrote home to the Foreign Office that, 'It has been their constant practice, to look upon them [foreign envoys] as hostages, and to make them personally responsible for all events' (Berridge, 2004: 118) . Well over two centuries after the establishment of the English permanent representation, different sociabilities still made for different perceptions. To the Ottomans, when the situation on which amān had been extended changed, it was a logical next step to withdraw amān, and the logical course of action to take against a non-muslim from a belligerent state without amān was incarceration. Ainslie (mis)translates this into an ancient, but since the early 18th century defunct, European (and Byzantine) diplomatic sociability, namely hostage-taking (Neumann, 2006) . At about this time, however, Ottoman diplomatic sociabilities were fading before European ones. The Ottomans sent a permanent ambassador abroad (to England) in 1793, and a Turkish Ministry of Foreign Afffairs was established in 1836 (Kürkçüoğlu, 2004) . Note, however, that Ottoman sociabilities were productive in the sense that they were crucial to the later development of the consulary institution throughout Europe, and then globally (see Leira and Neumann, forthcoming) . Yurdusev (2003: 186) argues that 'the formulating of some of the most essential elements of the contemporary world's diplomatic system -permanent missions, extraterritoriality, and reciprocity -drew upon the experiences of the directors of Florentine, Genoese, and Venetian settlements in the Ottoman domains'. If we add that the Ottoman practices owed much to Byzantine ones in the first place, it is certainly correct that modern diplomacy is an OttomanEuropean hybridization, although, due to the power differentials in the wider setting in which emergent diplomacy was imbricated, the former element certainly registered less than the latter.
9 While the hybridized character of modern diplomacy is accepted across the board among practitioners (for China, see Zhang [forthcoming] ; for Russia, see Zorin et al. 1959; and for Vietnam, see Nien [2004: 31 et passim]) , there is as yet little scholarship regarding the genealogical details.
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Compared to the Ottoman-European case, European-Chinese 19th-century encounters demonstrate similarities where the importance of myths is concerned, and dissimilarities in the outcome of clashes between narrative sociabilities. Both George Macartney, who visited the Chinese Emperor in 1793, and Lord Amherst, who visited in 1816, thought that greeting the Emperor by prostrating yourself (kowtowing) might involve worship, and so abstained from performing it. As seen from the Chinese side, kowtowing need not indicate worship, but given that the Emperor was considered to be the only son of Heaven, it is easy to see how this may not have been clear to the English envoys. What we have here are different religiously informed narrative sociabilities. Indeed, even if Lords Macartney and Amherst had decided to stay, it is highly unlikely that the Chinese would have considered the ensuing exchanges to be anything else than the paying of tribute, for this was the only narrative sociability available for the Emperor's meetings with representatives of other polities (Suganami, 1984) . Note that, whereas the Chinese political myth was similar to that of Byzantium (and indeed Western Christian and Ottoman myths), the narrative sociabilities were different. Whereas the Byzantines could converse freely with envoys from other polities in a number of spaces, formally or informally, and could draw on a variety of narrative sociabilities, in the Chinese case, there was only one narrative sociability (tribute-paying), and it severely narrowed the field of interaction. Note also that, historically, like most other non-Christian narrative sociabilities, this Chinese diplomatic sociability gave way to European ones. There is nothing to indicate that the permanent ambassador is on the wane (cf. Wolfe, 1998) .
Sociability III: The dean
My third mini-case is the ordering of the diplomatic corps. The diplomatic corps is the totality of diplomats accredited to a sovereign at any one time considered as a body, for example, all the diplomats accredited to the Court of St James (that is, to London) or all the diplomats in Washington. It has been recognized by international law since the Congress of Vienna (1815), but its history stretches back to the 17th and 18th centuries. Traditionally, the diplomats of the different sovereigns, and particularly the ambassadors, were rivals, and there were few cross-cutting bonds that made for solidarity. It was noted earlier how, in 1708, almost all the heads of missions to London acted in unison on behalf of one of their number. This was a very early example of the kind of group agency for which the concept of corps diplomatique emerged in 1737 (in a handbook for diplomats written by Antoine Pecquet; Hamilton and Langhorne, 1995) . Again, a functionalist account lies close to hand. In the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance, the material needs of embassies (i.e. an entourage headed by an envoy which came on specific business) were taken care of by the host country. With the event of permanent embassies, this began to change. In 1556, England insisted that permanent ambassadors pay for their own lodgings. A century later, this was becoming common practice. In 1698, Russia and the Habsburgs decided to stop catering for one another's diplomats and adhere to the new practice as well (Anderson, 1993) . The ensuing common materialist interest that foreign diplomats shared in seeing to it that the host country held up their end of the bargain was clearly a factor making for solidarity.
The key factor that hampered collective action by the diplomatic corps remained status. Ambassadors were the personal representatives of their sovereigns to the sovereign of the host country, which meant that it was part of their job description to get as close as possible to the sovereign. At the same time, it was intersubjectively understood that the relative way in which the host country sovereign treated them was directly proportionate to the esteem in which he held his various brother sovereigns. This status-ridden narrative sociability detracted from the social space available for other things at multilateral meetings or series of meetings such as audiences, receptions and formal dinners. Status was also a challenge for practices such as the signing of treaties, because the order of signing often held up the proceedings. Note the cultural specifics of the status rivalry.
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The arguments made in favour of status elevation included the point at which the polity in question had converted to Christianity and the respective abilities of the sovereigns to cure disease. That power was ubiquitously held to emanate directly from God. The argument was that this made it a good indicator of the respective favour in which the sovereigns stood with God. The assumption was that this should be the key factor in deciding respective status (Anderson, 1993) . Note that these are explicitly religious concerns. The struggles over precedence sometimes escalated into skirmishes:
The best and best-known example of this is the battle fought in the streets of London in 1661 between the retinues of the French and Spanish ambassadors, the culmination of two centuries of bitter competition of this kind. The official entry to the English capital of a new Swedish ambassador became the occasion for a struggle over which of the two rivals should give way to the other; in this almost fifty men were killed or wounded. The Spaniards were heavily outnumbered (the French ambassador, d'Estrades, had prepared for a struggle by bringing to London a number of officers from regiments commanded by himself and his son as well as soldiers from the garrison of Gravelines, on the northern coast of France); but they none the less won the immediate contest by cutting the traces of the horses pulling the French ambassador's coach. (Anderson, 1993: 63) Louis XIV made this skirmish casus belli, and the king of Spain apologized. With a certain solidarity beginning to emerge between foreign diplomats, ordering the fight for status emerged as a question of ordering the institutional set-up of the corps diplomatique. The historical answer to this fight was a fixation of rank based not on who the ambassador represented, but on when he had arrived at court. Seemingly, religious arguments such as the date of conversion or the ability to cure scrofula lost out to a purely functional ordering principle. Note, however, that religion is still there. For example, when the Princess of Brazil (i.e. the Portuguese equivalent of the Princess of Wales) married in 1760, the master of ceremony, Margrave de Pombal, simply informed the guests that the Papal nuncio and the envoy of the Holy Roman Emperor would be given precedence, while the rest would be ranked on the basis of when they were accredited (Anderson, 1993) . One reading of this would be that the diplomatic corps still had a Christian skyhook. It was still a hierarchy of descending closeness to God, but it had become a somewhat truncated hierarchy. Note that, to this day, in most Latin American states and also in a state like Germany, this ordering of the diplomatic corps still holds sway (Rana, 2007: 129) . Whereas in most states the ambassador who has manned the post for the longest time automatically becomes doyen or dean of the corps diplomatique, in these states it is always the Papal nuncio who fills this role. However long an ambassador representing a non-Christian state may have served, a Christian will still outrank him or her.
To sum up so far, my first and uncontroversial claim is that pre-World War I diplomacy was very much a European affair. In 1914, most relations between European and non-European polities were not heavily institutionalized, and those that were (with Siam, for example, and Japan) were historically fresh. Pace Sahlins, the meeting of narrative sociabilities seems to be crucial to the actual interaction that makes up the initial meetings between polities. Regardless of whether the interlocutors understand themselves as being specialists in myth (missionaries whose main attention is on cosmology) or norm entrepreneurs (traders whose main attention is on material reciprocity), initial interaction takes the form of negotiation of narrative sociabilities. With some notable exceptions, European narrative sociabilities have been the basis for these meetings. Ottoman diplomacy shaped contemporary diplomacy, but it did so to a lesser degree than did European diplomacy. We may conclude that European diplomacy forms the basis of global diplomacy. My second and more controversial claim is that the diplomatic culture that emerged must be said to be specifically Christian. Third, since Christian myths contributed to shaping sociabilities and practices that are now taken to be doxic, today's diplomatic culture still bears the patchy marks of its Christian origins. The answer to the question of whether contemporary diplomacy is Euro-centric must therefore be a clear 'yes'.
Euro-centrism's relevance
In political discourse, it is often enough to name a phenomenon in order to prove its relevance. The naming itself, for example of something as Euro-centric or someone as a terrorist, sets in train a whole range of effects. Not so in academic discourse, we are told. Relevance has to be ascertained, not simply assumed. So our next questions will have to be: if present-day diplomacy is Euro-centric, why and how should we care? I will conclude the analysis by availing myself of the suggested conceptualization of diplomacy in order to attack these questions on the three levels of myth, sociability and practice.
First, the level of myth. I will argue that having myths is inevitable, but that the myths themselves are transformable. If any political phenomenon must be anchored in myth, this myth must inevitably begin as a culturally specific phenomenon. From this beginning, however, it may transform and outgrow its specific origin.
Let me begin with historical inevitability. If any political culture needs anchoring myths to exist, then it follows that diplomatic culture, as a historical phenomenon, must necessarily be anchored in myths that are historically specific. Furthermore, in light of the fact that all key diplomatic systems known are anchored in myths of kinship and religion, the importance of the historical anchoring of contemporary diplomacy in Christian myths loses some of its fizz. If it had not been a Christian variety on the theme that we are all God's children that had informed global diplomacy, it would in all probability have been some other variant on the same theme. As sociologists of religion are quick to point out, however, there is no inherent link between myth and practice. On the contrary, one of the preconditions for a myth to establish itself as anchoring of discourse may be that there is a certain leeway in the way the myth may be interpreted, so that a plethora of groups may adhere to the same myth, without actually agreeing on its exact meaning (Leach, 1954) . Any founding myth enables and constrains, and if all likely candidates turn on kinship and religion, there is no inherent reason to think that one particular myth of kinship and religion would enable and constrain more or less than any other. The action lies elsewhere. As Foucault (1997: 147-148 ) once remarked, the important question 'isn't whether a culture without restraint is possible or even desirable, but whether the system or constraints in which society functions leaves individuals the liberty to transform the system'. In our terms, as long as myths do not rule out any groups ipso facto (and the founding myth of Christian diplomacy does not, since any group is a potential candidate for conversion), they simply make possible the restraints that are inevitable to social life. In our case, one should therefore look for social variation at the levels of sociabilities and practices, and not at the level of myth.
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The Christian diplomatic myth is not uniquely peaceful: An Iroquois example A corollary of the view that diplomatic myths invite peaceful sociabilities and practices by functional necessity is that, contrary to doxic presentations, there is nothing historically unique about the peacefulness of the European diplomatic myth. Since this point is so often taken for granted, it calls not only for logical, but also for empirical, backing. One way to provide that is by discussing a myth underpinning another diplomatic tradition than the European one.
Among the 15th-to 19th-century Haudenosaunee (People of the Long-House), better known as the Iroquois Confederacy or League, we find a highly ritualized diplomacy rooted in myth and centred on a particular narrative sociability, namely meetings at the wood's edge and, subsequently, in conference, focusing on a particular form of messaging involving a particular kind of beaded belt called wampum (Jennings, 1985) . It is the myth, with its stress on peace, that is of principal interest here.
The myth that grounds Iroquois diplomacy -among the Six Nations of the Confederacy as well as between those nations and other nations -specifically concerns the founding of the Iroquois Confederacy and its external relations. 13 The reading that follows is based on a version given in Onondaga-Iroquois by chief and Fire-keeper Skama-wa'ti in 1888 and published in the fifth volume of American Anthropologist (Hewitt, 1892) .
14 The story takes place 'in the times of our forefathers'. It falls in three parts (Fenton, 1985: 15) , where the first describes a series of heroic actions, the second concerns the lessons that the hero (or heroes) deduces from those actions and puts before his people 'for all time', and the third concerns the administrative ordering of the Confederacy. Part one begins with a statement to the effect that the chiefs of the nations of Natural Man tried to transact business by the council-fire but failed, due to the nefarious work of Thodo-da'-ho'. Hewitt (1892: 140) writes about his use of the term 'Natural Man' as being 'the literal translation of the present Iroquois name for "Indian" -On-kwe-hofi-we'. The principal hero of the story is De-ka-na-wi-da, with his younger brother Hai-yohwat-ha or Hiawatha being the main sidekick (in other versions, this relationship is reversed). De-ka-na-wi-da decided to seek out Tho-do-da'-ho'. After a false start, he established rapport with the other chiefs. They assembled 13 strings of wampum to aid them in their work, and De-ka-na-wi-da, saying they should 'express gratitude', sang. He stated that 'this shall be observed as a custom for all times. They shall sing the Six Songs as occasion requires' (Hewitt, 1892: 135) . De-ka-na-wi-da appointed two spies, who, covering parts of their journey in the shape of crows, succeeded in their mission (and forged an alliance in the process). They described Tho-do-da'-ho' as 'not human; he is daimonic and superhuman'. De-ka-na-wi-da replied that:
We must go to the place where Tho-do-da'-ho' abides. It is our duty to endeavour to reconstruct his mind, so that he shall again have the mind of a human being. If we can accomplish this great work we shall be fortunate, and we shall reap fruitful benefits from it. In this enterprise we must use the 'thirteen matters' [i.e. wampum belts].… When we have reached our destination, the habitation of Tho-do-da'-ho', we shall make a fire for him 'at the wood's edge'. We will speak to him and we shall hail him by congratulatory words. We will also tell him that we have a matter in which he is concerned; but this latter shall come to pass in the 'Principal Place'. (Hewitt, 1892: 137) De-ka-na-wi-da then sent a messenger to notify 'the resident councillors of their arrival'. He returned, reporting that the resident councillors:
'ordered me their cane to come here; they have kindled their fire at the edge of the woods, and there we will meet, beside the thorny underbrush.' The resident chiefs went to the place where the fire had been kindled, and there they met the visiting chiefs. (Hewitt, 1892: 137) After 'preliminary business', the visiting chiefs sang the Six Songs. Tho-do-da'-ho' heard the singing, began to change and was greatly pleased. De-ka-na-wi-da then proceeded to change his hands from being like 'the feet of a turtle', his feet from being 'like those of a bear', his hair from being like 'wreathing and hissing serpents', to becoming 'natural', using wampum. Only his penis, which was curled around his body, did not yield. Three times De-ka-na-wi-da cut it off to 'its natural length' -'six thumb widths' -but each time it regenerated: 'Then the chiefs said "Although this will not submit, yet it will not now have the potency to kill persons; hence, leave it; it will make no more trouble." Thus they made and changed Tho-do-da'-ho' into a natural man.' This statement brings part one of the myth to a close. Note that Tho-do-da'-ho's becoming a 'natural man' involves getting his 'natural' body shape back, as well as restoring his 'reason and anthropic feeling' (Hewitt, 1892: 138-140) .
The focus of part one is the interaction between De-ka-na-wi-da and Tho-do-da'-ho', but a number of statements make it eminently clear that what is at stake are relations between two collectives. Tho-do-da'-ho' is but the pars pro toto for a collective that is alienated from and in conflict with De-ka-na-wi-da's, and it is explicitly the latter's collective (and not only De-ka-na-wi-da himself) that initiates and conducts mediation.
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Note how the stress put on false starts, the need to deal with third parties and so on highlights the durative aspect of mediation. Note also the key sub-theme of how De-ka-nawi-da has to insist on the humanity of the other in the face of claims by other members of his collective to the effect that the other is non-human; a precondition of mediation is the recognition by the collective of the other as human. This recognition explicitly and, I would argue, in some degree necessarily takes the form of using one's own collective as a yardstick for what is normal and reasonable. 16 In the second part of the myth, De-ka-na-wi-da lays down the mediation with Tho-doda'-ho's collective as exemplary for all future mediation with other collectives:
We must now work for the good of the Commonwealth and its laws as our second great object. … We are bound also to carry this Law around and show it to all the nations, and we shall name it the Great Law -the Great Law of Equity; for all the nations without exception, hate us of the 'Extended-House'. Besides, it is a fact that battle-axes are crossed and men are slaughtering one another; so now we must put this evil from the earth. We must cast it deep down into the earth. (Hewitt, 1892: 140-141) The myth then elaborates these two themes concurrently; how the Iroquois nations 'have but one head, one tongue, and but one blood in our bodies', and how 'All the nations will look upon the Law, and all Natural Mankind will like it and desire it .… A council-fire in behalf of this Law shall be kindled for all nations.' Examples are given of nations that have accepted the law (for example, the Hurons), and who have lit new fires to enlighten even more far-flung nations (for example, 'the Seven Nations living toward the sunrising'). The myth does, however, take note of the possibility of rejection: 'And when this matter will extend itself in all directions, there may be some who will not be willing to receive it, but we shall not be reprehensible.' However, if some of these go on the attack, 'something occult and supernatural will happen to him' (Hewitt, 1892: 141-143) . Part three of the myth specifies the duties and privileges of the different Iroquois nations, by gens, on a kinship basis.
Matthew Dennis (1993; cf. Crawford, 1994: 368-369) highlights how 17th-century Iroquois drew on metaphors of kinship when they approached European polities. Jennings (1984: 8) Brandão and Starna, 1996: 220) .
The similarities between the European Christian diplomatic myth and the Iroquois one are striking. What matters to us here, however, is simply that they both stress peace.
I take this to demonstrate that there is nothing uniquely peaceful about the European diplomatic myth. It follows that arguing to the contrary would be a case of unwarranted Euro-centrism.
Myth and practice
At this point, the objection may be raised that the Iroquois frequently engaged in warfare, and that warlike interaction with other polities stands in stark opposition to the peaceful quality of the diplomatic myth. The opposition is certainly there. Since myths are polyvalent, they may be read in many different ways and ground a number of different practices. Note, for example, how, on the strength of the very myth just analysed, a relationship between the Iroquois and another polity may be classified as belonging not under the Great Law, but outside of it, making it privy not to diplomatic practices, but to others such as warfare. A peaceful myth, however universalistic, may lend itself to non-peaceful interpretations. The main point here is a corollary, namely, that this duality also goes for the European case. Historically, European diplomacy also has its violent corollaries. For example, threatening, often by invoking military capabilities, is a practice inherent to all known diplomatic systems. In Greek diplomacy, regularly invoked as grounding the Christian European one, it was absolutely central. 'Greek diplomats talked like any other Greeks.… [Threats were commonplace.] A Greek speaker wishing to utter a threat did not trouble to disguise it by nicely graded conversational phrases, and the recipient did not go into an emotional tailspin but weighed the matter on its merits' (Grant, 1965: 262-263) . Another example is the diplomatic practice of presenting the counterpart with a fait accompli, which is often brought about by military means.
18 Practices of diplomacy and war are heavily imbricated in one another. There is also an overlap in sociabilities. In the Middle Ages, European diplomats did part of their negotiation on blood-drenched battlefields, whence they had been transported by soldiers (Mattingly, 1955) . The genealogy of European diplomacy demonstrates its imbrication in an overall discourse on how to deal with other polities where peaceful proceedings are but one alternative to violent ones. In this, European tradition is similar to all other known diplomatic traditions. When Ho Chi Minh (quoted in Nien, 2004: 52) evokes Sun Tzu to argue how to win 'in military operation, the best is by stratagem, second by diplomacy, and third by armed force', he furnishes an example of this (and also of privileging peaceful means over violent ones). European diplomacy seems to be neither more nor less peaceful than other diplomatic traditions in this regard.
To sum up, it is hardly surprising that we may easily identify a glitch between diplomatic myth and diplomatic practices, and there are good functional reasons why diplomacy and war share practices and sociabilities. Since, empirically, we are dealing with features of all known diplomatic systems here, there is no Euro-centrism ipso facto.
The problem arises once the two facts just established -that European diplomacy has no particular claim to being uniquely peaceful either by dint of its founding myths or by dint of the pervasive effects on the social of its peaceful practices -are not given their due when European diplomacy is discussed as a general social phenomenon. This happens on a regular basis. To take a key example, consider the definition of diplomacy given in the standard handbook (six editions since 1919):
Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states, extending sometimes also to their relations with vassal states; or, more still briefly, the conduct of business between states by peaceful means. (Satow, 1979 (Satow, [1917 : 3, point 1.1) This definition is Euro-centric in the sense that it defines diplomacy as a phenomenon that exists 'between the governments of independent states'. The terms used, 'government', 'state', even 'independent state', leave no doubt that we are talking about a specific historical phenomenon here, namely modern diplomacy, which, while hybridized, is basically a European phenomenon. We need look no further than to etymology (diplomacy is Greek for double-folding; Constantinou, 1996) or to the Iroquois experience to see that there is no reason to define diplomacy as a European phenomenon only.
A second problem with this definition flows from the first. Although basically European, modern diplomacy is a hybridized phenomenon. Satow's definition occludes how, on the level of myth, kinship and religion play a role in all diplomatic systems, and how, on the level of practices, they may intertwine empirically. Where sociabilities are concerned, there are also formal similarities. Gift exchange, however asymmetrical, is a sociability that is common to all known diplomatic systems, and the sharing of food (a specific gift, as it were) is a sign of status acknowledgement in all systems. All this speaks in favour of a less culture-specific definition of diplomacy than Satow's, say, as communication and managing of relations between polities.
Perhaps most importantly, the commonplace foregrounding of tact is problematic not because it is inaccurate, but inasmuch as it occludes the violence, degradation and humiliation that also accompanied European diplomacy. The effect is for European diplomacy to emerge as a uniquely peaceful practice. As demonstrated, this is doubly wrong, for it occludes how all known diplomatic traditions are peaceful by dint of their myths, and also that diplomacy is necessarily imbricated in wider relations that are not only peaceful, but also violent.
Conclusion
Contemporary diplomacy is a culturally biased game, and the bias is Western. Diplomacy rests on myths that have their origins outside of diplomacy itself. Its emergence is inevitably steeped in power and, perhaps less inevitably, in violence. It also seems clear, however, that this power has been productive. The sociabilities and practices of European diplomacy have spread to third parties, and third parties use them for their own interaction. Despite its specifically Christian and European roots, contemporary diplomacy has, in other words, proven itself as a global institution. Furthermore, if contemporary diplomacy has proven able to adapt to such challenges as revolutions and decolonization (see e.g. Armstrong, 1999) , at present I see no social forces that are likely to make for anything else than incremental change in sociabilities and practices.
Such changes have been rapid since their onset some 150 years ago. As late as in the 1830s, there was a major scandal between two non-European powers when the US, in an attempt to demonstrate to their Ottoman counterpart the high value of the gifts that they bore them, left the price tags on (Yilmaz, 2008: 30) . What we see here is that the sociability of gift exchange is shared, but that the practices involved are not. It was only in 1856 that Turkey was accepted by European powers as an ostensibly fully competent diplomatic partner. When Japanese diplomats appeared in the United States in the 1890s, there was a clash over sartorial practices.
19 Note, however, that self-reflectiveness about the specificity of one's own practices has increased dramatically since then. Self-reflectiveness in dealing with the other may ease interaction and make clashes of practices more manageable. Indeed, clashes on the level of practices are fairly everyday in diplomacy, and they are to a certain degree inevitable. Given that it is mostly European practices that have been copied, and given that this makes it easier to partake of these practices for Europeans than for others, it could be argued that there is a certain Euro-centrism at the level of diplomatic practices. We certainly have reason here to be aware of how diplomatic practices disadvantage certain groups of individuals and certain individuals. This, however, has proved itself to be a manageable challenge.
The most pressing Euro-centric challenge regarding diplomacy lies, I have argued, not with diplomacy's own myths, sociabilities or practices. It is rather a meta-challenge which concerns how, quite without warrant, diplomacy is regularly defined as historically uniquely European, and uniquely peaceful at that. Historically, diplomacy has been one discourse among many that frame relations between polities, relations that were also marked by violent and degrading discourses. Using diplomacy, traditionally understood, as a privileged frame for remembering and understanding these relations at large may easily make these relations appear retrospectively to have been more asymmetrical and more peaceful than they would appear through other frames. In the extent that such a privileging of diplomacy paints European agency in a better light than alternative ways of representing it, such a privileging of diplomacy is Euro-centric.
I conclude that the Euro-centrism of diplomacy is not to do with the history of the Christian myth that historically grounded diplomacy and only to a minor degree with diplomatic practices as such. The major challenge is external to diplomatic discourse itself, and concerns the relative importance of diplomacy for how world history is recounted and remembered. It turns on the epistemological question of how and when 9 Further work is needed on the degree to which the European sociability of reciprocity, which was not matched by Ottoman imperial thinking, also put Ottoman diplomacy at a disadvantage vis-a-vis new parties. I thank Bahar Rumelili for discussions of this point. For discussions of hybridization and post-colonialism, see Said (1993) and Bhabha (1994) . The precondition for this literature is Nietzsche's insight that nothing has only one origin. 10 Note that non-practitioners of diplomacy are very often sceptical of this kind of hybridization, making for interesting tensions between a given state's foreign and domestic policies. 11 Note also the cultural specifics of the reason for challenging them, namely efficiency. 12 One particularly important practice in this regard is the degree to which diplomacy is actively inclusive; see Constantinou (2006) for a splendid historical discussion. 13 Eric Wolf (1982: 67) held that the Iroquois were a creation of Europeans, that they were really nothing more than a multi-ethnic trading company. In an overview of the lingering importance of migration to our understanding of cultural change, David Anthony (2006: 54-55, n. 3) turns the tables on Wolf by accusing him of Euro-centrism. To Anthony, Wolf's stated problemthat there were a number of adopted, non-Iroquois (Delaware, Ninticoke, Mohegan, etc.) in their midst, is only a problem for a biologically oriented European mind. However, 'if biology is independent of language, then the simple movement of bodies into Iroquoia should not affect how we think about Iroquoian culture -what matters is how the immigrants acted. If they adopted Iroquoian language and culture and lived in Iroquoian houses and behaved according to Iroquoian rules, an Iroquoian identity was maintained. Wolf's proposal that the Iroquoian tribal identity was a fiction created by French and English colonials can be defended only if you believe that biology equals culture … the five 'nations' or tribes of the pre-European Northern Iroquois can be traced back archaeologically in their traditional five tribal territories to at least as early as AD 1300, more than 275 years before European contact. One could argue, in fact, that the five prehistoric "nations" of the Northern Iroquois were older than most European nations at the time of contact, about 1575. This just doubles the irony in the idea that the European nations "created" the Iroquois in their own European image.' 14 My reading is based on the referenced secondary literature. Due to my inadequate knowledge of the cultural setting, I may have lost points that are key in the cultural setting. Inadequate information on and understanding of indigenous terms may also have caused misunderstandings. 15 Indeed, in some versions the wizard is A-ta-tar'-ho, the Onondaga chief, and his transformation is given as the reason why the Onondaga are the Fire-keepers of the Council. See http://www. indigenouspeople.net/hiawatha.htm 16 The stress on bodily normality and the equation of bodily abnormality with the animal-like invites a psychoanalytical reading, as does the equation of what could be called Tho-do-da'-ho's animus dominandi with the potency (from Lat. potestas, which is also the etymological root of power) of his phallus. 17 Hewitt translated this in 1888, so gens would be a corporate lineage in which decision-making was confined within a group tracing common ancestry through either the male or (as in this case) the female line. Lewellen (1992: 10) holds this to be Morgan's discovery, but Morgan simply perpetuates the standard use of the term in international law in the Middle Ages and into the 17th century, when this branch of law was known as ius gentium, later ius inter gentes. Gentium is the genitive plural of Lat. gens, 'people'.
18 So-called gunboat diplomacy is an example of this. The so-called dash to Pristina airport by 175 Russian peacekeepers during the night of 11 June 1999 is another (Pouliot, 2010) . For a discussion of the concept of fait accompli, see Constantinou (1996) . 19 As a result of signalling, Japanese diplomats have been working in European attire ever since (Suganami, 1984) . Here we have an instructive example of power-laden change in a practice.
